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THE INDIAN MIND

Essentials of Indian Philosophy and Culture

Edited by
CHARLES A. MOORE
With the assistance of
ALDYTH V. MORRIS



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CHARLES A. MOORE, for many years senior professor of philosophy at the University of Hawaii, died in April, 1967, before his work on this volume was completed. Long an advocate of the promotion of greater tolerance between people of the East and West, Professor Moore was known internationally as the innovator and driving force behind the East-West Philosophers' Conferences, held in Honolulu in 1939, 1949, 1959, and 1964, which brought together some of the leading thinkers of the Orient and the Occident to exchange ideas and to enhance their understanding of other traditions. His career as teacher, conference director, editor, and author was distinguished in its breadth and effectiveness in achieving East-West rapport.

Every effort has been made by those involved in finishing this book to maintain the high standards set by Professor Moore. A special recognition is owing to Professors S. K. Saksena, Walter H. Maurer, and Kenneth K. Inada for their help in preparing this posthumous work.

WINFIELD E. NAGLEY
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Preface

THIS VOLUME presents a middle-of-the-road explanation of the fundamentals of the Indian mind as expressed in its great philosophies, religions, and social thought and practices. The essays which comprise this symposium, since they are technical in themselves and written by experts in their special areas, will meet the needs of the technical scholar. But they will also meet the needs of the educated reader generally, as well as the technical expert, because over-technical considerations have not been stressed except where necessary to avoid the sacrifice of fundamental accuracy and technical integrity.

The chapters in this volume are papers presented at the four East-West Philosophers' Conferences held at the University of Hawaii in 1939, 1949, 1959, and 1964.* Not all of the papers presented at these conferences are included here because of technical and publication limitations; among the papers not presented are a few of the extremely technical papers in specialized areas.

While this is essentially a reprint volume in the sense that all the papers have already been published, they have been re-edited by the editor and by the authors of the papers, except in the case of the paper by Professor Takakusu, who died in 1945.

* These volumes are: *Philosophy—East and West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944); *Essays in East-West Philosophy* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951); *Philosophy and Culture—East and West* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1962); *The Status of the Individual in East and West* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967).

The order in which the papers are published herein does not correspond with the order of their presentation at the conferences, but has been determined in a more systematic manner regardless of the date of the original presentation. Following this Preface, there will be a more technical and yet general introductory treatment of the Indian view of the status and nature of philosophy as such. This is followed by papers dealing, in succession, with metaphysical matters; epistemological concerns; problems within the areas of ethical and social philosophy; special and particular problems in more restricted areas, such as religion, legal and political philosophy, etc.; and, finally, the status of the individual in Indian thought and culture. This last section of the book is a concentrated examination of this particular problem, which has always been of major importance in philosophy, in both East and West, but is of special importance in the contemporary world and therefore requires full and detailed consideration—partly also because it is the basis of so much misunderstanding all around.

One of the basic principles of the conferences at which these papers were presented was that the descriptions (and evaluations) of the various philosophical and cultural traditions of East and West should be entrusted to representatives of those traditions, so that listeners and readers could most closely approach the ideal of understanding other traditions as the people of those traditions understand themselves. This principle has been followed in this volume—as in the volume on China, and will be followed in the volume on Japan in this series—but, for special reasons, there are two exceptions here.

In order to do full justice to the very complicated developments of Buddhist philosophy, which originated in India, despite its less significant status there than the various systems and thinkers within the Hindu tradition, it was considered highly advisable to include here a paper which deals essentially with early Buddhism—the paper by Dr. G. P. Malalasekera—and a paper which deals with the more technical developments of Buddhist philosophy and with Buddhism in its specific relationship to the Hindu systems—the paper by Dr. Junjirō Takakusu. These authors are not Indians, to be sure, but the subject-matter with which their chapters deal is of basic importance in an over-all consideration of Indian philosophy, and it is felt that their chapters add materially to the soundness of the volume as a whole.

It is possible that this generally wise policy of having each

Asian tradition described by personal representatives rather than by "outside" scholars has led to somewhat more idealized presentations than might have been given by more "objective" Western experts. On the other hand, there is the thought that it is really more accurate to see a people—or even an individual person—in its best light, in terms of its ideals, because these do essentially constitute the mind of the given tradition. (The law of the land as written out in somewhat ideal form in constitutions and formal statute law, for example, is often said to constitute or express the real mind or character of a people or nation, but that does not mean that there are no lawbreakers.) There is also the thought that "outside" experts are sometimes even more biased—one way or the other—than the representatives who, as the ones here do, combine personal knowledge of the tradition and sound scholarship.

Partly because of the technicalities of the subject-matter and the languages involved, and partly because the volume is a symposium to which outstanding scholars have contributed, the matter of detailed editing has been somewhat more difficult than it would have been in a different kind of volume. While general consistency and uniformity of basic style have been achieved, there are some variations in several aspects of style, because of the occasional adoption of common usage rather than of complete technical accuracy and also because some of the authors themselves strongly preferred different styles—and the editor respected these preferences.

For the careful—and possibly critical—reader it may be helpful to call attention to a few of the perhaps unusual styles involved, and some of the variations.

In general, hyphenation has been used abundantly, the purpose being to provide greater ease of reading on the part of the non-Indian reader who is not familiar with the technical and sometimes very long words, expressions, titles, etc., in Sanskrit and Pali (Pāli). This may irritate the technical expert, but it will unquestionably help the uninitiated and the general reader. At times, with admitted inconsistency, some expressions and titles are not hyphenated—because they are so well known.

Capitalization is always a problem in articles and books written by Asian authors, because most of them strongly prefer a much greater use of capitals than Westerners would in the same situation. In general, capitalization has been kept to something of a minimum, but not always, and in these latter cases the retention of capitals was out of respect for the wishes of the author or because of fear of

distortion of technical meanings that might have resulted from "outside" editing. (Reference is made especially to Professor Takakusu's chapter.) The matter of capitalization of some technical terms is of genuine significance. Generally speaking, in these cases the capital is used to refer to ultimates or metaphysical principles or realities, whereas the lower case is used for the empirical aspect referred to by the same term—as especially illustrated by *Nīrvaṇa* and *nīrvaṇa*—sometimes very difficult to distinguish—and *Ātman* and *ātman*.

Common usage is occasionally employed, usually involving the inconsistent use of the stem form and the nominative case—as, e.g., *karma* (not *karman*), *ātman* (not *ātma*), and *parva* (not *parvan*). Among other cases of following common usage are Ārya Samāj for Ārya Samāja and Brāhmo Samāj for Brāhma Samāja and *sannyāsin* for *saṁnyāsin*. In some cases, technically accurate terms are used rather than those in common Western usage: e.g., *brāhmaṇa*, not *brāhmin*; *yogī*, not *yogi*. The words "*buddha*hood" and "*buddha*-nature" have been used because they are technically more accurate than the capitalized form.

Different authors not only sometimes strongly prefer different styles of editing, but also frequently prefer different translations of technical terms, and it would be presumptuous, even dangerous, for any editor to force such a learned group of authors into any single pattern of English equivalents. This policy seemed the better part of wisdom. Sometimes authors have used different styles of documentation—at no sacrifice of clarity.

In all the editing, clarity and ease of reading were the goals sought, provided that this attempt did not sacrifice technical accuracy. This seemed to be the only feasible guiding principle to follow.

One of the discrepancies in some of the papers is that between the use of Sanskrit terms and Pāli (and, in fact, of "Pāli" and "Pali") terms—sometimes almost indiscriminately. Some changes have been made, but, again, because of the editor's deferring to the wishes of the authors there are still some discrepencies in this area. A few specific examples should probably be mentioned: Brāhmaṇas, to refer to the texts, which are parts of the Vedas; Brāhmaṇism, to refer to the philosophy or religion which is based upon those texts; and *brāhmaṇa*, to refer to the highest order in society, the priest or teacher. Both *yogī* (Hindi) and *yogin* (Sanskrit) are used rather indiscriminately.

For the convenience of Western readers, plurals have been formed by simply adding a terminal "s" to words in Sanskrit, although this practice is not followed in the chapter by Dr. Malalasekera, where most of the terms are in Pāli. (The reader is referred to an editor's note at the beginning of that chapter which will explain the special style used there and the reason for that style.)

Appreciation is hereby expressed by the editor to Professor Kenneth K. Inada, Professor Walter H. Maurer, and Professor S. K. Saksena for their significant assistance in connection with the editing of these papers, and in connection with the transliteration of Sanskrit and Pāli terminology. Appreciation is also expressed to Princeton University Press for permission to re-publish, not completely but in large part, the paper by Professor Junjirō Takakusu, which was originally included in *Philosophy—East and West,* published by Princeton University Press in 1944.

Charles A. Moore

Honolulu
April 29, 1966

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THE INDIAN MIND:
ESSENTIALS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE

CHARLES A. MOORE

Introduction: The Comprehensive Indian Mind

THERE ARE two vital reasons for studying—and understanding—Indian philosophy: first (for the general reader), in order to understand the country and its people, which is impossible in the case of India without understanding its basic philosophies because the intimacy of philosophy and life in India is so fundamental to the whole Indian point of view; and, second (for those concerned with philosophy), in order to enlarge the scope of philosophy and to broaden the horizons of philosophers by attending seriously to the important contributions that Indian philosophy and philosophers have made to the totality of philosophical knowledge and wisdom—or at least can make if the rest of the world will attend seriously to those contributions. Intense and comprehensive study and fundamental knowledge are necessary for the realization of these two goals, or, in fact, for the realization of either of them.

Fact and fancy, truth and error, understanding and misunderstandings, truths and half-truths, a tendency toward extremes and exaggerations, admiration and ridicule, devotion and what seems at times to be malicious distortion—all these abound, and frequently in a very confusing mixture, whenever one thinks of the great subcontinent of India with its 450 million people, its recent unbelievable plight in terms of starvation, disease, and ignorance, and the plethora of ideas and practices that seem to isolate her from all other peoples and thought-traditions of the world, East and West. Confusion, misunderstanding and misrepresentation, bewilderment, and almost universal neglect—especially by Western

thinkers—have been much in evidence for centuries with reference to this greatest democratic nation in the Eastern world. We are not thinking here of those Westerners (and some Easterners) who have seen in India the source of fulfillment of their own selfish search for power and riches. These people have not known India; they have merely used her—mis-used her. Not only that, but they have apparently attempted to destroy the spirit and even the "mind" of this great people. But that spirit has refused to die, and now, at long last, is reasserting itself. India is determined, now that she has survived almost unendurable tragedies by maintaining her indomitable spirit, to revive its proud tradition and heritage and to take the place among the great peoples of the world which it once held—in culture, in learning, in religion, and in philosophy.

It should not be necessary today even to remind the peoples of the West—and, in fact, some of the people of Asia as well—that India must be understood—correctly and profoundly. Superficial knowledge will not do. Looking for the exotic will not do. Finding in her mind and spirit either the antithesis, or merely the complementary, to the West will not do. These will not do because they prevent genuine understanding and lead only to distortion and falsification—and mystification.

We must concern ourselves—and we are concerned here—with the mind of India in its richness, its variety, its profundity, its depth and its heights in the broad area of philosophy, and with the powerful molding force which the philosophies of the Indian tradition have exerted on the many-sided culture of the Indian people throughout the ages—with great difficulty during the dark era of foreign domination, to be sure, but even then. The philosophies, the religions, and the basic cultural patterns of India have been so deeply engrained in the minds and lives of the Indian people that not even virtual slavery—politically and economically—could prevail against them. It is these deep-seated ideas and ideals that are the mind of India, and it is these that we must understand in their fullest significance—both in themselves and, in many cases, for the world at large.

Understanding is a very complicated matter. Genuine understanding must be comprehensive, and comprehensive understanding must include a knowledge of all the fundamental aspects of the mind of the people in question. Philosophy is the major medium of

understanding, both because it is concerned deliberately and perhaps uniquely with the fundamental ideas, ideals, and attitudes of a people, and also because philosophy alone attempts to see the total picture and thus includes in its purview all the major aspects of the life of a people.

But there is still more to understanding and to the search for understanding, and here we face attitudes which the authors of the learned essays in this volume cannot provide but can only encourage. Reference is made to the indispensable need, on the part of the "outsider," for a genuine desire to understand. Open-mindedness, cordiality to alien ideas and ideals, and actual determination are necessary ingredients of the attempt to understand an alien people, if that attempt is to be successful. One must at least attempt to see the other people as those people see themselves—and the chapters in this volume are in accord with this maxim. We cannot truly understand as long as we merely stand outside and look at; we must try to think and feel with. Above all, we cannot understand another people if we look through biased eyes, with the conviction of superiority, or with the assumption that what is different from our own must therefore be worthless. These are difficulties that attend any attempt to understand any "other" people, but they call for special notice here since they probably apply to India with unusual force because of the many wrong impressions and distortions that are such a part of the Western "understanding" of India. It is going to be especially difficult to rid our minds of these strong misconceptions—but it must be done. There is no other way.

One final point: understanding does not involve approval or acceptance: it may lead to exactly the opposite. However, we must understand each other in any case, and, in the case now at hand, India, the conviction is here expressed that genuine understanding will promote genuine friendship and harmony and a much greater meeting of the minds than ever seemed possible. In philosophy, India is more like the West, basically, than is any other Asian tradition, and India is more like the West than it is like any other Asian tradition, at least in one man's opinion. Furthermore, there is nothing inscrutable or non-understandable in or about Indian philosophy, either because of the substance of Indian philosophy itself or because of the allegedly "totally different" bias of Western philosophy and the Western mind. But these points of similarity—and the writings in which they can be found—are almost completely ignored or very largely overshadowed by the excessive attention given to

the early, to the religious, and to the "different" aspects of the Indian tradition as a whole. This is tragic, but true, and it perpetuates clichés, oversimplifications, and actual distortions. And these, in turn, prevent genuine understanding and also prevent the West's taking Indian philosophy seriously. That is why it is tragic.

It is not easy to understand such a complex mind, civilization, culture, tradition as India presents. There are probably some common denominators of mind and practice which may be said to constitute the essence of the Indian mind in certain respects. But there is such great complexity and variety in practically every field —even in the languages which are causing so much practical difficulty for the government at the present time—that we must not even seek simplicity or even attempt to determine fundamental ideas and ideals without realizing from the start that these fundamentals express themselves in a great variety of ways and have changed greatly over the long span of some 4,000 years of a high level of thought and civilization. While we must seek out the basic pattern of thought and culture, we must realize, too, that the Indian mind is made up of more varieties of religion, more philosophies, and a greater complex of cultural practices than most any other major civilization in the world.

Philosophy is our business in this volume, and it may be well to quote an outstanding authority on Indian philosophy, Professor Mysore Hiriyanna, who says, "A striking characteristic of Indian thought is its richness and variety. There is practically no shade of speculation which it does not include."[1] The longer one studies Indian philosophy, the more one realizes the accuracy of that observation.

It may be appropriate to offer literal and factual justification and clarification of this contention concerning the richness and variety of Indian thought. Let us look, then, if ever so briefly, at the major movements and periods of Indian philosophy—in its broad meaning—and at the major systems and some of the subsystems which constitute the Indian philosophical tradition—and realize, too, that there is ever so much more to the Indian thought-tradition as a whole, including a vast literature of strictly religious thought as such which is not to be—but has long been—confused with the philosophical thought with which we are concerned here.

There is, first, the Vedic period—usually dated approximately between 2500 and 6000 B.C. This is the period in which the foundations of Indian philosophy were established, in which the two fundamental aspects of Indian thought and life, the two *dharmas*, the active and the contemplative, were developed and formulated, in the Vedas and Upaniṣads, respectively. To some, these may not be strictly philosophical—by others, they are mistakenly accepted as the whole or the essence of Indian philosophy—but, in any case, they do establish many of the basic ideas to which much of Indian philosophy conforms, and they contain a degree of authoritativeness, to such an extent that orthodox Hindu philosophy is defined in terms of its acceptance of the Veda—in the fuller sense of the word, including the Vedas and Upaniṣads. True, one would have some difficulty recognizing the ideas of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads in most of the technical philosophies of India, but this authoritativeness prevails even today as a basic part of the tradition. In the Vedas, we start with a very multitudinous polytheism, with all its appendages, and develop gradually to monotheism and, finally, to what might be called a strictly philosophical monism resulting unquestionably from the innate intellectual curiosity of the Indian mind[2]—but the activism of this part of the Indian tradition is never sacrificed. In the Upaniṣads, the usual interpretation calls for either a complete break with the Vedas, certainly in the sense of a replacement of activism by contemplation and inner searching for the real, or what might be called a speculative continuation of the problem of the One which the Vedas speculatively envisaged at its final stage, as it were. But, now—in the Upaniṣads—this speculation takes place primarily in terms of the experiences of the great mystical seers, and their basic method is mystical experience or intuition, with the minimizing of the role of reason as the, or even a, final method of reaching the ultimate truth.

The second period is the Epic period, dated approximately from 500 or 600 B.C. to A.D. 200. This is often considered either not a strictly philosophical period at all or, at most, a semi-philosophical era, because much of its product is primarily descriptive of the social customs and practices of the Hindu people, and the laying down of laws for life in accord with the Hindu philosophical and religious convictions. This is the period of the two great epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, which are a combination of history, mythology, and religio-philosophical thought. It is the period of the Dharma-śāstras, the treatises on social philosophy and law, with their emphasis on social welfare, on the three basic values of morality, pleasure, and material welfare—with little or no real

concern for ultimate emancipation (*mokṣa*)—and on social stability in line with the caste system. During this period are developed the several and various political philosophies of India, including the very realistic *Artha-śāstra* of Kauṭilya, which would vie well with the most realistic political philosophies the world has ever known. It is the period that produces the *Bhagavad-gītā,* what has been called the living bible of Hinduism to this day. In other words, this is the period in which the basic ideas of original Hinduism are applied to life in its many facets, thus, as it were, completing the picture of Hinduism and giving it complete control over the mind and the actions of the Indian people.

But this period is much more than that. It is probably the most productive, the most creative, the most open-minded, and the richest period of Indian thought in terms of the great variety of specific ideas and theories developed, and also in terms of the rise of actual major philosophical systems, and many minor systems or viewpoints (skepticism, irrationalism, etc.), which were later crowded out of significant existence. These major systems are the non-Hindu, the heterodox, but still Indian, systems of Cārvāka materialism, Jaina realism, dualism, pluralism, and relativism, and the four (or more) major schools of Buddhism, which embrace, *depending greatly upon interpretation:* pluralism *and* monism; realism, relativism, "nihilism," idealism, *and,* according to some, even Absolutism, *but,* to others, intrinsic anti-Absolutism; unmetaphysical (or even anti-metaphysical "ethicism" *and* transcendental metaphysics; the scientific method and empiricism *and* even "analysis" *and* faith *and* mysticism; intuitionism *and* rational and logical methods and methodology—and perhaps *especially* the denial of all "labels" or "isms," or schools or specific viewpoints.[3] All of these arose in opposition to the Hindu tradition in their basic philosophies, though they retain some of the traditional manners of living and, except for Cārvāka, something of the same ultimate goal of life, ultimate emancipation from the sufferings and evils of life itself.

As S. Radhakrishnan, the great contemporary Indian philosopher and statesman, has said:

> . . . it [the Epic period] was an age keenly alive to intellectual interest, a period of immense philosophic activity and many-sided development. We cannot adequately describe the complex inspiration of the times. The people were labouring with the contradictions felt in the things without and the mind within. It was an age full of strange anomalies and contrasts. With the intellectual fervour and moral seriousness were also found united a lack of mental balance and restraint of passion. It was the era of the Cārvākas as well as the Buddhists. Sorcery and science, scepticism and faith, license and asceticism were found commingled. When the surging energies of life assert their rights, it is not unnatural that many yield to unbridled imagination. Despite all this, the very complexity of thought and tendency helped to enlarge life. By its emphasis on the right of free inquiry the intellectual stir of the age weakened the power of traditional authority and promoted the cause of truth. Doubt was no longer looked upon as dangerous.[4]

The third period is the Sūtra period. This begins, according to some interpreters, one or two or three centuries before the Christian era and lasts into the early centuries of the Christian era. During this period the great Six Systems of Hindu philosophy were formulated, systematized, and written in terms of the original basic texts of these great—and greatly varying—schools of philosophy. The tendency among contemporary Hindus is to synthesize these systems as six aspects of one unified point of view or perspective, but the basic differences among them, the sometimes vigorous arguments between the competing systems, and the fact that each system continued for centuries in its philosophical identity would tend to question that interpretation. Here are represented, in these major systems, the logical realism and pluralism and theism of the Nyāya (the School of Logic); the atomic realism and theism of the Vaiśeṣika; the evolutionary dualism—and pluralism—of non-theistic Sāṁkhya; the meditative method—and dualism and pluralism—of theistic (?) Yoga; the practical and ethical—and what might be called linguistic—emphases of the realistic, pluralistic, and anti-theistic Mīmāṁsā, which is the systematization and rationalization of the Vedas; and the systematization and rationalization—of several varieties—of the Absolutism and monism of the Upaniṣads in the Vedānta. There is no philosophical uniformity among these systems except their alleged acceptance of the authoritativeness of the Vedas and the literal, but somewhat questionable, unanimous search for *mokṣa,* emancipation. These systems vary in practically all philosophical essentials except for their common agreement in the belief in the soul—as well as matter, by the way, except in the Vedānta, and in later periods even there.

This basic period is followed by what has been called the Scholastic period or the period of commentaries or commentators. This period endures even to today. It consists of an almost unbe-

lievable continuity of development of all the systems, heterodox and orthodox, except the Cārvāka. But it also produces, in the guise of mere commentaries, a wide variety of points of view—at times, virtually new systems—that reveal the originality and creativity of mind and thought possessed by these commentators, many of whom are commentators only in what might be called the polite sense of the word. Many of the major problems of philosophy are originated and developed during this period, sometimes on the basis of development of the ideas suggested in the Sūtras, sometimes going far beyond anything even suggested there. Also, among these commentators one finds, even within the same school, a sometimes unbelievable variety of points of view, as even in the Vedānta, where the range reaches from realistic pluralism to illusionistic monism and practically all varieties in between, and yet all are called Vedānta. Vedānta is decidedly not to be identified with Śaṁkara, as is usually the case, especially in the West.

Thus, in the vast changes that took place from the rise of religio-philosophical thought in the Vedas to the present day—with the omission of a dark age when Indian philosophy suffered practical oblivion while India was dominated by outsiders—Professor Hiriyanna's contention that "practically no shade of speculation" is not included in Indian philosophy and that a striking characteristic of of Indian thought is its richness and variety is amply justified and "documented."

Most of India's philosophical systems and her most significant ideals and concepts originated centuries ago, and they suffered a dark age far darker than the alleged dark age of the West. However, this does not mean that our concern is merely of antiquarian interest. Instead, we are concerned with India's philosophies because they still provide the guiding principles of the life of the people and also because there are very significant ideas and concepts there—no matter how old they are—to which the rest of the world may well turn for new insights and perhaps deeper wisdom.

Nor is it true that the philosophies of India, the great systems and the important concepts, have little relevance for the India of today. It is a major mistake to think that the philosophies of India belong to the past and that the "new India" is simply the India of today or a wholly different India molded by contemporary, chiefly Western, influences. The striking developments and changes that are taking place in contemporary India are not out of accord with

the Indian tradition—though they are out of accord with some of the distortions and excesses of that tradition which arose primarily under the stress and pressure of unfortunate events and almost unbearable circumstances. The apparent incompatibility of traditional India and contemporary India is basically only that—apparent. Long-range, comprehensive, and deep understanding will correct such an impression. There are changes, yes, but changes within the essential context of the many-sided and inclusive tradition that is India.

To illustrate this: India's strong contemporary interest in raising the standard of living—and its emphasis on practical activities and on practical idealism—is as intrinsic to the Indian mind and culture and tradition as it could be to any people on earth. Let it be said, too, as will be explained in one of the chapters of this volume, that the deep spirituality which is so dominant in India, both in thought and in life, is not so otherworldly, or escapist, or pessimistic, or negative that it finds violation of the spiritual in the abundant life. There is no incompatibility here.

As said before, philosophy is our concern here. But philosophy is not merely an (or *the*) indispensable medium of understanding and of knowing a people or a culture. Philosophy is also—and more basically, of course—the search for knowledge, for truth, for wisdom. In this respect, India provides the basis for a potential philosophical renaissance, if only the rest of the world, especially the West, will search out the new insights, the new intuitions, the new attitudes and methods which might well at least supplement if not replace or correct—and at least enlarge—the restricted perspective of the Western mind. As Professor George P. Conger has said, ". . . the question here is not so much whether Indian can contribute, as whether the West is ready to receive."[5] As in the case of understanding, so in the case of learning *from* another people, some remarkable attitudes and attributes are indispensable—and very difficult to adopt. Perhaps it is even more important in learning from than in learning about another people that the "outsider" must come with the spirit of humility, with open-mindedness and cordiality, and with both willingness and determination to learn—or learning will be impossible, or superficial, or possibly self-defeating.

Of course, every tradition is biased in its own favor—and India is not free of this limitation, either. The West, however, generally speaking, suffers not only from such a conviction of the superiority

of its own attitudes and methods in the sphere of philosophy (and all learning)—not to mention the influence here of certain basic Indian ideas which "make no sense" to the Western mind—but has the additional disadvantage, at least as of now, of being largely ignorant of the tremendous riches of the almost inexhaustible Indian philosophical mind. What the West knows about India (and China, too, in fact) is largely only one aspect (and frequently a misleading aspect) of the very complex total picture. In India's case (as well as in China's), it is a knowledge which is historically, philosophically, and even simply intelligently so one-sided as to make genuine and comprehensive understanding impossible, and also to deny even the existence, let alone the significance, of many of the greatest philosophical concepts the mind of India has discovered. Oversimplification and distortion are the inevitable results of such partial and historically false—early—and consequently significantly superficial knowledge of the great philosophical panorama of the Indian intellect, as well as of the Indian spirit. The Vedas, the Upaniṣads, and the *Bhagavad-gītā*, along with one extreme Vedāntin, Śaṁkara, have dominated the Western "picture" of Indian philosophy, but they do not constitute anything like the whole or the essence or even, as so often contended, the basic spirit of the almost infinite variety of philosophical concepts, methods, and attitudes that make up the Indian philosophical tradition. Instead, if these are taken as the whole or the essence—as, to be sure, even many Indians would have us believe—there would be a narrowness and a limitation of significant philosophy that would well warrant the neglect that Western philosophers have shown toward that tradition. But they are not the whole.

The all but utterly ignored rational and logical, the systematic and analytical, character of the Indian philosophical tradition—for all its intuition and mysticism and Absolutism—is just one, but a vital, illustration in this connection, and is an undeniable fact, one which makes India much closer to the West in its philosophizing than any other philosophical tradition in the whole of Asia. And, yet, this is almost completely ignored by the West and is frequently played down by those who are so seriously concerned with bringing the great spirituality of India to the allegedly unspiritual West. Another significant illustration of this same general point is the very much greater emphasis on theism rather than Absolutism in the Indian spiritual tradition as a whole. Another is the tendency to emphasize the spiritual alone and in its purity, in isolation from all relationships with the non-spiritual, although this is an extreme interpretation, and is not by any means unanimously held either by the major systems and thinkers or by modern interpreters. For example, Sri Aurobindo says, ". . . spirituality itself does not flourish on earth in a vacuum,"[6] and many would agree with him as reflecting the transcendent and immanent character of the spiritual, as in the West. This is not to deny the significance of intuition and spiritual realization in Indian thought—and religious zeal in Indian life—but it is to deny their exclusive significance and to emphasize, as strongly as possible, the keen and profound intellectual and logical attitudes which are of the essence of Indian philosophy as such, as sharply contrasted with China and Japan. There are many such affinities, many compatibilities, many actually common or shared ideas, ideals, and attitudes—as well as methods. On this latter point, by the way, reference is made to the fact that the use of intuition in India is not a source of incompatibility with Western philosophy when one recognizes the actual use and significance of intuition in Western philosophy, and the fact that intuition is actually of strictly limited use in Indian philosophy.

However, there are many differing approaches to reality, to life, to truth, and to philosophy itself in the Indian tradition which, at least in emphasis or relatively speaking, are or should be of exciting significance for the inquiring mind of the Western philosopher. They should also be of profound significance to any philosopher who is seeking the traditional and basic—and unique—goal of philosophy. That goal is the total truth about reality as a whole, and that goal, and our attempt to achieve it, which *is* the true work of philosophy, requires, as Professor B.A.G. Fuller said a long time ago, "an observation and study of the data presented by all . . . aspects [of life, experience, and the universe itself]."[7] This means that philosophers need, indeed must have, the insights, the suggestions, the experiences, and the different approaches of all philosophers everywhere. Otherwise, as is so commonly the case in the West, philosophers will be limited to their own narrow perspective, to their own biased methods, and, believe it or not, to most of the traditional Western ideas, ideals, attitudes, and methods. And to be so limited is not to be a philosopher.

It might be in order to cite some specific philosophical concepts, attitudes, and methods which are widely considered to constitute the philosophical mind of India or its essence. These points might well serve at least as guidelines. It might also be valuable

to suggest a list of specific "new" ideas that India offers to the philosophical world out of its unique experiences, ideas which, possibly, are different only in emphasis but at least in that respect and to that extent. But, since any such attempt is sure to be questionable, in that no such list can be compiled with complete accuracy and comprehensiveness without so many exceptions as to make it almost meaningless (and certainly not *characteristic*), it could be wiser, rather, to suggest that the reader judge for himself from the various—and varying—presentations to follow what he considers to be the essence of the Indian philosophical perspective and of the Indian mind and also what he considers to be—to repeat—"new" or "different" ideas, ideals, attitudes, and methods which might well be worthy of serious and unbiased consideration in the interest of philosophy and truth itself.

However, although it is dangerous and questionable to do so, it is deemed justifiable and even helpful to cite here those philosophical principles, attitudes, and methods which are, by rather common agreement, considered characteristic of Indian philosophy as a whole. Prior to this listing, however, it is advisable to repeat the caveat to the effect that a substantial case could be made against every one of these characterizations as genuinely characteristic of Indian philosophy and certainly as characteristic of it in its entirety, since every one violates or ignores the multiplicity and complexity of the Indian mind in these specific areas. (In the list that follows, some of the doubtful aspects of these "characteristics" will be cited so as to offset the danger of oversimplification of the complex Indian attitudes.) Be that as it may, it is usually contended—by Indians—that the following are the important principles of Indian thought.

1) A universal and primary concern for, and almost a preoccupation with, matters of spiritual significance—in practically every sense of the word, in all its many ramifications, and perhaps especially with reference to the ultimate spiritual goal of man. (There is not *too much* of an argument against this "characteristic"—except for the entire extensive literature of the Dharma-śāstras and the Artha-śāstras, in which social welfare is the primary concern and man's ultimate destiny is of little or no serious concern—and the possibility that *mokṣa*, emancipation, may not in fact be of supreme or even genuinely significant concern to the authors of at least four of the Darśanas.)

1a) Belief in a soul or self or spiritual principle—except in materialistic Cārvāka and, some contend, except, too, in Buddhism, with its doctrine of *an-ātman*, no self, but this latter contention is clearly a too literal and unacceptable interpretation.
1b) Belief—throughout all of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism—in the doctrine of *karma* (the principle of ethical cause and effect, or justice) and rebirth.
1c) Monism and/or Absolutism—well-known but extremely questionable *characterizations* unless we indulge in extreme and excessive limitation of view and ignore very much, if not most, of the comprehensive philosophical literature that demands inclusion. (There is no Absolutism or monism in any of the Six Systems of Hinduism except the Vedānta, in any school of Buddhism, in Jainism, or in the Cārvāka.)
1d) Basic concern with ultimates—the metaphysical perspective, or the "sense for the infinite," as it has been called—and only secondary concern for the empirical perspective.

2) An emphasis upon the close relationship of philosophy and life, in the sense that, as Radhakrishnan says, "Every doctrine has been turned into a passionate conviction, stirring the hearts of man and quickening his breath and completely transforming his nature,"[8] and also in the sense that philosophy and its activities are not to be undertaken as an "intellectual exercise," or motivated by a desire for truth for its own sake, but must be lived, such that, in common agreement, the truth must not only be known but also *"realized."* As Professor W. H. Sheldon once said—in paraphrase—in the West we want to *know* the truth, in India they want to *be* the truth.[9] Even this could be challenged in most of the six systems.

3) The recognition of the validity and necessity of intuition (and also the wisdom of certain authoritative texts) to supplement the rational and intellectual pursuit of truth—and the corollary, or preliminary conviction, that reason is distinctly limited in scope and finality, although it is the basic method of philosophy in India as elsewhere. (Intuition, authority, and criticisms of reason are all overemphasized both in Indian and in Western descriptions, generally.)

4) Another interesting corollary of this perspective is the view that truth is achieved by the whole man, not by his intellect alone—in sharp contrast with the Western perspective and accepted procedure. Dr. S. K. Saksena, in his paper here, states the case succinctly:

What, then, should be the source of philosophical knowledge? It is neither sense, nor reason, nor intuition, but the whole of the man. Philosophy is the reaction of the whole of man to the whole of reality. Man is a spirit, an integral whole, consisting of his body, mind, intellect, passion, and will, and his reason alone can no more exhaust him than his animality can encompass his reason. Reason or rational thought is only a part of his being. Purely rational knowledge, therefore, militates against and contradicts the affirmations of the rest of a man's being and receives acceptance only by a corner of his self.[10]

(This view is not followed unanimously among Indian philosophers, however.)

5) The synthetic attitude in both philosophy and religion, such that practically all views are deemed partly true or true from their particular points of view, and such that the ultimate truth is a synthesis of the many partial truths discovered by different approaches to truth and reality. (An aspect or application of this synthetic point of view is in a sense violated in this volume and in the volumes for which the papers were originally written.) In India—at least, this is the general contention—metaphysics, religion, ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, psychology, and methodology and epistemology are all parts of one substantial and total problem; they are all therefore essentially interrelated. They are not to be isolated or separated even for the sake of specialized study, for that violates their unity in life and in reality. Yet, here we find these problems, in the large, treated separately. The style followed at the conferences and in the volumes in this series was chosen deliberately, however, for the sake of clarity for non-Indian students and readers—and also to avoid too general presentations and the consequent overlapping of material and the repetition that would be practically inevitable. (Even this synthetic interpretation might be an exaggeration, because there are several distinctly separate areas of philosophical literature dealing with different aspects of the total problem—such as, for example, Dharma-śāstras, Artha-śāstras, Mokṣa-śāstras, etc.)

6) Consequent upon this synthetic perspective—whether we apply it to reality, to truth, to the pursuit of truth, to the approaches to spiritual fulfillment (religions or ways of living[11]), or in one's perspective toward the values of life, India is proud of her over-all attitude of intellectual, philosophical,[12] religious, ethical, and practical tolerance (although, as said earlier, there is reason to question the degree of tolerance among the great systems and thinkers in the long and complex Indian philosophical tradition).

7) Deep concern with the inner man and with the introspective approach to truth, as contrasted with outer things and values, such that, generally speaking, the transformation of the inner self is primary, while concern with changing or controlling the outer world is distinctly secondary, if significant at all. Put another way: to be, not to do, is of supreme importance.

8) An emphasis upon—and great achievements in—the area of psychology in its broadest and most comprehensive sense. India seems to be characterized by the conviction that the mind (and even what the West calls "soul") is transcended by the "self" and that the ranges of man's psychic capacities are "infinitely" greater than in any other philosophical tradition, both in its highest reaches and in its subtlest potentialities.

9) Allegedly, although there are strong arguments against it in its exclusive accuracy and especially in metaphysics, there is a general consensus among Indians that their tradition is characterized by idealism in one sense or another, and certainly in the areas of ethics, political thought, and social thought and practices. (*In fact,* the Indian attitude is really a synthesis of idealism and realism, of spirituality and cultural, intellectual, and worldly values.)

10) Ethics, though considered of absolute importance in life, is, nevertheless, considered to be subordinate to spiritual realization, as only a means thereto, and to be completely transcended once the ultimate goal of spiritual fulfillment or emancipation has been achieved.

11) There are certain common ethical principles that seem to dominate the life of India, essentially non-hurt (sometimes called nonviolence), restraint and self-control, non-attachment, and what, for lack of a better word, may be called charity.[13]

12) While the values of social life—morality, pleasure, and material welfare, in general—are accepted as significant in the empirical realm, these are all subordinate to and, at most, instrumental toward the ultimate spiritual goal of emancipation (*mokṣa*), or spiritual realization.

13) A common social philosophy, including the three empirical values previously mentioned—morality, pleasure, and material wel-

fare—and, in its proper sense, some form of classification of the members of society in the interest of the welfare of society as a whole and as a means of spiritual progress through the performance of one's social and moral duties.

14) The need for moral purification as a necessary preliminary to the process of knowledge—fitting the Upaniṣadic (and Vedāntic) teaching that without moral purity one cannot even enter upon the search for spiritual truth.[14]

15) An interesting somewhat related "theory" is that, once one has entered upon the search for knowledge, the process consists of three steps, namely, hearing it from a teacher (or reading it in an authoritative text), reasoning about it, and then meditating upon the conclusions so reached until those conclusions become, not mere academic knowledge, but the kind of soul-stirring convictions mentioned before which alone are capable of transforming one's nature in accordance with truth.[15]

16) Some—though not all—Indians point to the belief in what is called "initial pessimism"—life is suffering—and "ultimate optimism" consisting essentially in the achievability of spiritual emancipation from the sufferings and spiritual inadequacies of life.[16]

17) *Yoga,* in one or more of its many forms, is considered essential to the pursuit of spiritual truth and the freedom of the spirit, since it provides the mental concentration necessary for freedom from all distractions which encourage or even produce ignorance and prevent the achievement of spiritual purity, truth, and fulfillment.

These major principles and attitudes may or may not be characteristic of Indian thought as a whole in any essential and exclusive sense, but, as emphases, (1) they must be understood if we would understand the Indian people, whose life and thought they guide, and (2) they are unquestionably at least basic tendencies in Indian philosophy and life—and, consequently, it is within these areas of emphasis in which India is the "expert" that she can contribute most to the total picture which is philosophy. And they may serve as useful guidelines for study—cordial or critical—of the many interesting and exciting, sometimes difficult, sometimes disturbing, ideas presented in the informative and provocative chapters to follow.

Notes

1. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932), p. 16.
2. *Ṛg-veda,* X.129.
3. This is the major point of the Mādhyamika system, and the Buddha also denied adherence to any one doctrine. (*Majjhima-nikāya,* 1.483–488.)
4. *Indian Philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; rev. ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), Vol. I, p. 272.
5. "An Outline of Indian Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore, ed., *Philosophy—East and West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 23.
6. Sri Aurobindo, *The Renaissance in India* (3rd ed.; Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1946), p. 11.
7. The full quotation is "a reflective and reasoned attempt to infer the character and content of the universe, taken in its entirety and as a single whole, from an observation and study of the data presented by all its aspects." *A History of Philosophy* (rev. ed.; New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1945), p. 1.
8. See S. Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, eds., *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pages xxiii–xxiv. See also S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy, op. cit.,* pp. 26–27.
9. See "Main Contrasts Between Eastern and Western Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore, ed., *Essays in East-West Philosophy* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951), pp. 288–297.
10. See his chapter here, "Relation of Philosophical Theories to the Practical Affairs of Men," at p. 25.
11. See examples: *Ṛg-veda,* I.164.46; *Bhagavad-gītā,* IV.11; IX.23; VII.21.
12. A. B. Dhruva, "Presidential Address," in *Proceedings of the Second Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress* (Benares: Philosophical Association, 1926), pp. 1–26; also S. Radhakrishnan, in S. Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, eds., *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy,* p. xxv. See also S. Radhakrishnan *The Heart of Hindusthan* (Madras: G. A. Natesan and Co., n.d.), pp. 135–137.
13. In this connection it might be good to cite Surendranath Dasgupta, who says that the fundamental points of agreement among Indian systems, excepting the Cārvāka, are: the theory of *karma* and re-birth, the doctrine of *mukti* or emancipation, the doctrine of the existence of the soul—Buddhism excepted—a pessimistic attitude toward the world and an optimistic faith in the end and certain general principles of ethical conduct such as control of passions, non-injury, etc. See



History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), Vol. I, pp. 71–77.
14. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* II. vii; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad,* IV.iv. 23; *Kaṭha upaniṣad,* II.24; and *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya,* I.i.1.
15. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad,* II.iv.5.
16. Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendra Mohan Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (3rd ed. rev.; Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1948), p. 16.

S. K. SAKSENA

Relation of Philosophical Theories to the Practical Affairs of Men

I. Practical Affairs and Religious and Scientific Beliefs

BEFORE WE inquire into the relation which philosophical theories as a class may have with the practical affairs of men, it may be worth while to ask what it is which generally guides and determines our conduct. The answer would probably be that it is by our beliefs, religious or secular, that we generally live and act. As the *Gītā* says, "Man is of the nature of his faith: what his faith is, that, verily, he is."[1] These beliefs may or may not be true, but, in the last analysis, it is these true or false beliefs which determine our conduct. While beliefs may be acquired in different ways, their chief sources are either the religious experiences of mankind, transmitted through theological knowledge, or the scientific knowledge of the day. These two sources of our beliefs cover almost the entire range of man's activities.

1. INADEQUACY OF SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

While the above two sources of our beliefs, religious and scientific, are practically the originators and modifiers of our conduct, there is a philosophical unsatisfactoriness about each of them. Scientific beliefs, which have the merit of objective validity, have, nevertheless, a grave defect inasmuch as they do not refer to man's deepest questions regarding the meaning and purpose of life, nor do they deal with questions of valuation and worth. Scientific knowledge, which deals with the true, ignores the good, and theological beliefs, which have the opposite merit of being practically useful by virtue of their relevance to the practical aspirations of man, have

DHIRENDRA MOHAN DATTA

Epistemological Methods in Indian Philosophy

THE SUBJECT OF THIS PAPER raises two questions which are very closely connected but are not identical. They are: (1) What, according to Indian philosophy, are the methods or sources through which men in general acquire knowledge? (2) What are the methods which Indian philosophers employ for solving their problems and acquiring knowledge? I shall discuss the subject in its first aspect (i.e., general epistemology) in some detail, and in its second aspect very briefly.

Knowledge and Its Sources

In Sanskrit the word for cognition in general is *"jñāna."* The word for valid cognition is *"pramā,"* and that for the source of valid knowledge is *"pramāṇa."* The problems of *pramā* and *pramāṇa* are discussed threadbare by the different schools of philosophy, because nearly all of them believe that human suffering is rooted in ignorance, the removal of which is the chief object of philosophy, and also because they believe that without a critical discussion of the theory of knowledge truth cannot be attained.[1]

As Indian philosophy has developed from the days of the Vedas in the midst of a series of changing racial, social, political, and religious influences over a period of at least five thousand years, there have arisen innumerable schools of thought, and consequently there has also been a large variety of epistemological theories. So, while in Western philosophy we are generally told of two sources of

knowledge, perception and inference, which are treated as synonymous with immediate and mediate knowledge, respectively, Indian philosophy, in its different major schools, recognizes up to six sources of knowledge, and some minor schools even add two or three more. Elaborate arguments are adduced to show the necessity of recognizing each as a separate source.[2]

THE MANY SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

The Cārvāka materialist admits perception as the only source of knowledge. Kaṇāda (the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school) and the Buddhist admit two, perception and inference. The Sāṁkhya admits three, perception, inference, and authority. Gautama (the founder of the Nyāya school) admits *upamāna* (knowledge by similarity), in addition to these three. The Prabhākara school of the Mīmāṁsā admits five, the four sources mentioned before and *arthāpatti* (postulation). The Bhāṭṭa school of the Mīmāṁsā and Śaṁkara's monistic (*advaita*) school of the Vedānta admit also a sixth source, namely, non-cognition, in addition to these five. Some others recognize instinctive or intuitive knowledge (*pratibhā*); some, unbroken tradition (*itiha*); and some, possible inclusion (*sambhava*) as other kinds of knowledge—but these three are not recognized by the major schools. Before we discuss these different sources of knowledge it will be useful to note a few important things about knowledge and validity in general.

VALIDITY

Valid cognition, which is obtained by any of these methods, is generally regarded as cognition which is free from doubt (*saṁśaya*), indefiniteness (*anadhyavasāya*), and error (*bhrama*), and which, therefore, reveals things as they are (*yathārtha*), furnishes the basis of successful activity (*saṁvādi-pravṛtty-anukūla*), and is not contradicted (*abādhita*) by any other experience. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists regard agreement with reality as the essence of truth. Bauddha (Buddhist) thinkers, e.g., Dharmakīrti, regard practical efficiency as the distinguishing mark that differentiates a valid cognition from an invalid one,[3] whereas the Advaitins (non-dualistic Vedāntins) emphasize more the uncontradicted nature of valid cognition.

Most thinkers hold that novelty should also be regarded as a necessary character of knowledge worthy of the name. So, memory (which is a reproduction of knowledge acquired in the past through perception or any other source) is not regarded as a separate kind

of valid cognition. Some others point out, however, that memory should be regarded as a substantive source of knowledge at least insofar as it yields valuable information about the pastness of an experience or its object—information which could not be obtained from any other source without its aid.

Two other important questions[4] regarding validity are: (1) Whether conditions that generate the validity of a perception or any other knowledge are intrinsic to the conditions that generate that knowledge, and (2) Whether the validity of that knowledge is known by the knowledge itself. Opinions are sharply divided on these matters. Roughly speaking, the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta hold that validity should be regarded as the natural or normal character of knowledge and invalidity as an exceptional phenomenon which arises when there are some accidental vitiating factors. So, they hold that the conditions of validity lie within the very conditions that generate the knowledge, and they also hold that the validity of knowledge is known from the knowledge itself, as it arises. For example, if the relation of the visual sense to the object is regarded as the condition of visual perception, then the validity of this cognition is also due to this very condition; and, moreover, as soon as such a perception arises we believe it to be true, and, therefore, we act upon it without hesitation and without waiting for its confirmation by any other knowledge. This position regarding the two questions of validity is called the theory of self-validity (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers hold the opposite view, namely, that of external validity (*parataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*). They believe that there are some special conditions (other than those of the knowledge itself) which generate its validity. For example, whereas the mere sense-object relation may be said to generate visual perception in general, the soundness of the visual organ, sufficiency of light, etc., may be regarded as the special conditions generating its validity (the absence of which may cause perceptual error). Again, the validity of this knowledge is not self-manifest. It is inferred from these special conditions or from some other data.


From this brief discussion it would appear that, whereas the attitude of some Indian thinkers toward knowledge is one of belief, that of others is one of neutrality or open-mindedness. But in addition to these two attitudes there is also a third, that of disbelief, held by the skeptical Buddhists, according to whom invalidity is the self-manifest character of every cognition, and validity (which is nothing other than the practical efficiency of it) can be established only indirectly (by its successful practical consequences).

Regarding the knowledge of knowledge itself there are also different views. The Sāṁkhya, the Vedānta, Prabhākara, and the Jaina hold that knowledge is self-manifest; the Nyāya holds that it is known as an object of subsequent introspection (*anuvyavasāya*). But Bhāṭṭas hold that knowledge is known by inference from the knownness of its object.

OBJECTS

In Indian epistemology, we also have different views regarding the status of the object of knowledge. Within the same system of Buddhism, for example, we have what may be called, in terms of modern Western epistemology, direct realism (held by the Vaibhāṣikas), critical realism (held by the Sautrāntikas), subjective idealism (held by the Yogācāras), and a fourth variety, which has no Western analogue, indeterminism (*śūnya-vāda*, held by the Mādhyamikas), according to which the object of knowledge (as well as any other thing) is not describable either as "is" or as "is not" or as "both is and is not" or as "neither is nor is not." Here is an example of subtle distinctions—even much subtler in some respects than most up-to-date Western epistemology—and a complete scheme of possible epistemological positions which evolved in India at least a thousand years ago. Except for Buddhism, most of the schools are realistic. The Sāṁkhya, which holds that all objects are the products of intellect, can also be called realistic, if it is admitted that this intellect is cosmic and not personal. Though there are among the later followers of Śaṁkara some extreme subjectivists who hold the theory that creation is only perception (*dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*), yet Śaṁkara, in spite of his metaphysical idealism, was an epistemological realist, as is clear from his emphatic refutation of the subjective idealism of the Yogācāra Buddhists. It is interesting to note that even an illusory perception is regarded by most Advaitins as having a corresponding object momentarily created.

But, though Sāṁkhya, Vedānta, and Jaina thinkers believe, like realists, in the presence of objects independent of knowledge, they do not think that consciousness is the product of the relation of the object to the knower. They hold that the knower is the self, which is intrinsically conscious, and that knowledge of objects is like the illumination of objects by the pre-existing light of a lamp. Consciousness, in itself, is eternal and original, but its relation to a par-



ticular object is conditional and accidental. But ranged against this position there is a group of influential thinkers of the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Mīmāṁsā schools who, like Locke, think that the self is primarily unconscious and that consciousness arises in it when it is properly related to objects. With this general idea about knowledge, let us have a bird's-eye view of its different sources.

PERCEPTION (PRATYAKṢA)

Perception is generally described as knowledge arising from the relation of the object to some sense. Five external senses (namely, those of hearing, sight, touch, taste, and smell) and at least one internal sense (*manas*, mind) are commonly postulated for explaining external perception and internal perception (of pleasure, pain, etc.). A peculiarity of Indian thought worth notice here is that a distinction is made between mind as knower and mind as the internal sense and organ of attention—the first being called *ātman* or *puruṣa* and the second *manas* or *antaḥ-karaṇa*. These two are considered to be two different substances by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. To perceive an object the self must attend to the object through its *manas*, and be related to it through the appropriate sense.

Is any immediate knowledge possible without the help of sense? This question is variously answered. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika[5] thinks that immediate knowledge ordinarily involves the direct relation of the object, so known, to some sense. But it recognizes certain exceptions which may be classed under two categories. First, there are those cases in which the sense is related indirectly to the object, yet the object can be said to be immediately known. For example, when the table is directly related to the skin of the hand, not only the table is perceived, but also the quality of touch, which is in the table, the hardness which inheres in the touch, the absence of an inkpot which characterizes the table—all these are immediately perceptible, though these latter cannot be said to be directly related to the sense, but only indirectly through the substance in which they are. The second class of exceptional cases includes those in which even no such indirect relation can be traced between the object and sense, and yet the object is felt to be immediately known. These cases are called extra-ordinary perception (*alaukika-pratyakṣa*) and are of three kinds. When we *see* a piece of sandal as fragrant (or cotton as soft, or stone as hard), the smell and touch are felt as immediate though really we cannot trace the relation of these to the sense of smell or touch. Erroneous perception of a rope as a snake, of heated air in the desert as water, etc., also belong to this class. In all such cases, some memory-idea vividly aroused by similarity, etc., functions like a sense relation and causes immediate perception. Whether such immediate perception is true or false depends on whether it represents the object as it is or not. There is a second kind of extra-ordinary perception in which an entire class of objects can be said to be immediately known when a particular member of it is immediately known. When a man sees his first tiger, and *sees* in it the general character of tigerhood, he can be said to see thereby all tigers, not, of course, as possessed of their respective individual properties, but as possessed of the general character of tigerhood, because, except tigerhood, there is no other attribute of tigers as a class which remains to be perceived. Such knowledge of a class helps induction. The third kind of extra-ordinary perception, admitted on the basis of the experience of the *yogins*, is perception through successful complete mental concentration on any object too small, too far away, or too much concealed to be related to sense.

It may be remarked in this connection that as the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Advaita Vedānta believe the self to be really infinite, the question of the possibility of the relation of the self to the rest of the universe without the medium of sense or body does not raise any theoretical difficulty. On the contrary, the fettering of the soul to the body is, for them, the reason for its limited knowledge. Even the Jainas, who do not admit the infinity of self (*jīva*), but admit only its power of expansion, hold that the self can the more directly know other minds and other things unconnected with sense, the more it can free itself from the forces of attachment that fetter it to the body. So, they hold that knowledge through sense, being through some medium, cannot be called truly immediate. Only the liberated saint can obtain full and immediate knowledge directly without the help of any sense. Patañjali, the founder of the Yoga system,[6] holds that one can know the mind of another person and also imperceptible objects by complete concentration of the mind on them. The Advaitins view immediacy as the basic character of the Absolute Consciousness, of which the knower, the known, and the process or mechanism of knowledge are apparent differentiations due to ignorance. So, for them, immediacy is not generated by the knowing process. The self's knowledge of an external object is empirically describable, of course, in terms of the function of the mind, or internal organ, and the sense concerned. In the light of this, the Advaitins say that in every

perception the mind flows out to the object through the sense and assumes the form of the object and establishes thereby a sort of identity between the mind and the object. But this process does not generate consciousness or immediacy. It only destroys the imagined barrier between the knower (which is nothing but the basic consciousness delimited by the mind) and the object (which is also the same consciousness delimited by the objective form) by a kind of identity established between the two delimiting and differentiating factors.[7]

So, for the Advaitin, every sense-perception is really the restoration of the basic identity between the knower and the known, and the allowing of the basic reality, i.e., consciousness, to reveal itself immediately. But such immediate knowledge is an extremely limited expression of the basic consciousness. When a person can altogether overcome his sense of identification with the body (mind, senses, vitality, and other individuating conditions) by realizing his identity with the basic consciousness, there is revelation of this self-shining basic existence. This is pure and absolute immediate consciousness.

DIRECT REALIZATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL TRUTHS

In this connection we may briefly mention the characteristic Indian notion of the direct realization (*sākṣāt-kāra*) of truth. This is common to all the schools, except the materialist, though truth or truths are differently conceived. The process of realization (*sādhana*), though differing in detail from school to school, has also a common pattern. This consists in learning the truth (from authoritative texts, preceptors, or other sources), reasoning critically about its pros and cons, and, if thus found acceptable, meditating on it intensely and repeatedly. This vigorous intellectual culture must be accompanied by moral reformation, that is, reorganization of all emotion and behavior by changing all old habits based on previous ignorance or misconception of the truth.

But how can such intellectual and moral exercise lead to direct or immediate knowledge? The matter is not so mysterious as it may seem to be. By repeated thought and behavior based thereon, we feel that we directly see a material body existing in all dimensions though only a color-patch forming a part of its front surface is present to sense. We see time on looking at the dial of a watch; on receipt of a piece of paper called a bank note we feel that we are receiving real money; we see danger in a frown or a red signal; we see thoughts in printed letters. Similarly, I directly feel as though I

am the body and separated from the rest of the world by my outer skin, limited and helpless. I feel that I am a man, a teacher, a Hindu, and so on. The objects of my ordinary desire—food, dress, house, and money—all directly appear as values, relatively stable and worth while.

Is it not possible to think, that by a similar but more consciously, rationally, and intently initiated process of repeated thinking, willing, and feeling, truths about the self, the world, and its values, different from these ordinarily accepted ones, can also be felt and realized at least as directly as these are in life?

In such realization the intellect rather than sense experience takes the lead, and reinterprets and re-evaluates the latter. It is the "theoretic component" which rules here over the "aesthetic" and even reveals itself through the latter.

INFERENCE (ANUMĀNA)

Inference[8] is generally regarded by Indian thinkers as knowledge from a sign (say, smoke) to the signified (say, fire) on the basis of previous knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the two. Though all systems discuss inference, the Nyāya treats it very elaborately. According to the Nyāya, a universal relation or induction is based on repeated observation in the light of the method of agreement in presence (*anvaya*, e.g., "All cases of smoke are cases of fire") and also (where possible) the method of agreement in absence (*vyatireka*, e.g., "Where there is no fire, there is no smoke"). Induction may be vitiated by non-observation of hidden essential conditions (*upādhis*) responsible for the apparent invariability between the two phenomena. Such a defect can be removed only by repeated and varied observation (*bhūyo-darśana*). The truth of an inductive generalization may also be deductively tested by indirect hypothetical argument (*tarka*) leading to a *reductio ad absurdum*, e.g., "If smoke were not accompanied by fire, then it would be without a cause, which is absurd." But, if the doubt is still raised, "What if events are without a cause?" it is silenced by the contradiction (*vyāghāta*) it would have with practical behavior, where we always seek a cause for producing an effect.

The Buddhists employ the method of five steps (*pañca-kāraṇī*) in order to discover a causal connection, and thereby an invariable relation, between phenomena: (1) non-observation of the cause as well as the effect; (2) observation of the cause; (3) observation of the effect; (4) observation of the disappearance of the cause; and

(5) observation of the disappearance of the effect. Thus, with the help of this double method of difference (as Dr. Seal calls it), a causal connection may be established between fire and smoke. Buddhists also lay down identity of essence (*tādātmya*) as another ground on which a universal proposition (e.g., "All oaks are trees") can be based.

But the Nyāya says of the first method that it cannot be applied when other circumstances vary and the suspicion of a plurality of causes cannot be removed. Moreover, there are many cases of non-causal uniformity (established by the Nyāya methods previously described), e.g., "All animals having horns have tails," on which inference also can be based. Regarding the second method, identity of essence, the Nyāya points out that it is not really a ground of inference. To say, "This is a tree, because it is an oak" is really no inference at all if an oak is already known to be identical with a tree.

An important distinction is made between the psychological process of inference (not necessarily expressed in language), which takes place in the mind of one who infers for his own self (*svārthānumāna*), and the demonstrative form of inference, which is used for convincing others (*parārthānumāna*). In the former, one argues: "This hill has smoke; whatever has smoke has fire; so, the hill has fire." But the demonstrative form, as Gautama conceives it, must have five steps:

(1) Clear enunciation of the proposition to be proved—This hill has fire.
(2) Statement of reason—This hill has smoke.
(3) Statement of universal relation, supported by concrete instances—Whatever has smoke has fire, e.g., the fireplace. Whatever has no fire has no smoke, e.g., the lake.
(4) Application of the universal relation to the present case—The hill has such smoke (which is invariably accompanied by fire).
(5) Conclusion—Therefore, the hill has fire.

There are some important points to note about this five-membered argument (*pañcāvayava-nyāya*).

First, it is the form in which debate and discussion should be conducted for the ascertainment of truth and establishment of theories. In order that there may be no ambiguity, digression, and shifting of ground, there is an explicit statement of the *probandum* and the checking of it by its restatement at the end—as in Euclid's geometrical proof.

Second, we do not have here a mere formal syllogism, but also an attempt to establish its material validity by the citation of concrete instances supporting the universal major premise. It is, as Dr. Seal says, an inductive-deductive, formal-material process.

Third, (because of this) it does not always assume the form of finality. Sometimes (to start a discussion and invite criticism) it lays down a tentative proposition with a provisional induction, supported by an example, waiting to see what the opponent can say against it. It then becomes a process of tentative discovery and provisional proof.

The fallacies which may vitiate the conclusion of such a process are mentioned by Gautama and treated by his followers very elaborately. The more important of these arise from (1) assigning a reason (middle term) which has no invariable relation to what is to be proved (major term), e.g., "The hill has smoke, because it has fire"; (2) assigning a reason which has no relation to (and, therefore, contradicts) what is sought to be proved, e.g., "Sound is eternal, because it is produced"; (3) assigning a reason which is not really present in the case in hand, e.g., "Sound is eternal, because it is not produced"; (4) assigning a reason which leads to a conclusion that is contradicted by an opposite and stronger inference, e.g., "Sound is eternal, because it is invisible, like the atoms" (this is contradictable by the valid counter-inference, "Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced, as is a pot"); and (5) assigning a reason which leads to a conclusion contradicted by direct perception, e.g., "Fire is cold, because it is a substance, like water."

KNOWLEDGE BY SIMILARITY (UPAMĀNA)

This is differently conceived by different schools and writers. The earlier version, that of Gautama,[9] describes it as knowledge of something, previously unknown, on the basis of its similarity to a familiar thing, e.g., "The *gavaya* (a wild deer) is like the cow." In later Nyāya it is more explicitly defined as the process by which we know the denotation of a new word on the basis of its similarity to a familiar object. In the same example, a man knows from an authority that a *gavaya* is a wild animal like the cow; then he happens to see that animal in the forest and comes to know, from that knowledge of similarity, that an animal of that kind is a *gavaya*.

The claim of this process to a status different from perception

and inference is that the relationship between the name and the object is not perceived, nor is it inferred, because no invariable concomitance (a universal premise) is used for reaching the knowledge.

Śabara,[10] the commentator on the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra*, describes this knowledge as a kind of analogical argument, as would appear from his example that we know the existence of souls in other bodies on the analogy of our knowledge of our own bodies' having souls.

But later Mīmāṁsā and the Advaita Vedānta conceive *upamāna* in a different way. About the Nyāya conception, they point out that it is a mixture of knowledge from authority and an inference based on it. According to them, *upamāna* is a process like this: When a man perceives a cow, and afterward perceives a *gavaya*, he judges, "This *gavaya* is like that cow." From this knowledge of similarity he passes to the knowledge "That cow (perceived in the past) is like the *gavaya*." This last knowledge[11] is peculiar. It is not perceptual, for the subject "cow" is not now present, and when it was perceived in the past it was not known to be similar to the *gavaya* (which was not known then). It is not an inference, since no universal premise is used to reach the conclusion. So, it is classed apart and called knowledge from similarity (*upamāna*).

TESTIMONY (ŚABDA)

Words of an authority (a reliable person or book) are recognized as a source of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika holds that this is inferential knowledge based on the reliability of the authority. But against this the Nyāya points out that even though this is admitted it only shows that the truth of the knowledge is established by inference, but not the content of the knowledge. If a patient says that he has a headache and you accept his statement because he is truthful, you first know about the headache from his words and then know the truth of his statement by inference from his truthfulness. The Mīmāṁsā and the Advaita Vedānta, which believe that the validity of every knowledge is inherent in it, go a step further to hold that as soon as you learn from the person about his headache you know and believe his statement. It is only in exceptional circumstances when there are reasons for doubt that you use inference to remove the doubt. Inference thus does only the negative work of removing obstacles to knowledge, and, as soon as this is done, knowledge arises and claims self-evident validity.

Moreover, it is pointed out by all the supporters of authority

that the conditions that generate such knowledge are very different from those which are necessary for inference. Such knowledge arises from the synthetic understanding of the meanings of the different words of a sentence. Four conditions are needed for this. The meaning of each word must raise a sense of incompleteness; this must be removed by the meanings of the other words which must be compatible with it; the words must be sufficiently close together so that they may be construed together; and, lastly, the purpose of the speaker (or the universe of discourse) must be understood. The knowledge of a command, or a request, from an imperative sentence more clearly supports this view.

POSTULATION (ARTHĀPATTI)

This fifth source of knowledge admitted by the Mīmāṁsā and the Advaita Vedānta is illustrated by the following stock examples: A man is known to fast during the day and yet grow fat. To explain this it is postulated that he must be eating during the night. Again, seeing that a man who is believed to be alive is not at home, it is known that he is outside his home. Similarly, finding that in the sentence "The chair ruled" the literal meaning of "chair" does not suit, we take the figurative meaning, "chairman." In all such cases we explain given conflicting phenomena by supposing the only thing that can resolve the conflict. It looks like an explanatory hypothesis, but it is not provisional and uncertain like a hypothesis. The Nyāya and other schools try to reduce it to inference drawn from a negative major. The first example is reduced thus: No one who does not eat at night while fasting during the day grows fat. This man grows fat. So, he is not such as does not eat at night, etc., i.e., he eats at night. Against this explanation it is pointed out that the very knowledge put in the major premise is not obtainable without a postulation. So, the explanation really begs the very question. Moreover, if we consult introspection (*anu-vyavasāya*), we find that we do not feel here like inferring from any premise, but, rather, like *supposing* or postulating something unknown which alone can resolve a conflict.

NON-COGNITION (AN-UPALABDHI)

Non-cognition is the source of our primary knowledge of non-existence. It is generally believed that we can perceive non-existence just as we can existence. For, looking at the table, we can say that there is no cat there, just as we can say that there is a

book there. But the Bhāṭṭa school of the Mīmāṁsā and the Advaita Vedānta point out that perception requires the relation of sense to its objects; but how can the sense be thought to be related to non-existence? The Nyāya says that sense is related to the positive locus of non-existence (in this case, the table) and through that to the non-existence which is a character of the locus. But this explanation is not accepted, because any and every character that is in something is not perceived by the relation of the thing to sense. (Seeing the table, we do not know its weight.) The character itself must be perceptible. But how can non-existence be perceptible? Thus, we come back to the old problem.

To explain this difficulty Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas hold that non-existence is known through non-cognition, just as existence is known through positive cognition. Of course, only appropriate non-cognition can yield such knowledge. If a thing should have been known under some circumstances had it been existing there, then the want of knowledge under those circumstances becomes the source of the knowledge of its non-existence.

THEORIES OF ERROR

Like knowledge, error also has been discussed threadbare by the different schools. Seven chief theories have been held and mutually criticized. We can give only the gist of them here. The nihilistic Buddhists hold that error is the appearance of the unreal as real (*asat-khyāti*). The idealistic Buddhists hold that the illusory object is nothing but the external appearance of what is really a subjective idea (*ātma-khyāti*). The Sāṁkhya holds that the illusory appearance is a mixture of the appearance of the real and the unreal (*sat-asat-khyāti*)—an unreal character attributed to a real substratum. The Advaita Vedānta holds that erroneous appearance is the temporary creation of ignorance, of a temporary object which can be described neither as wholly real nor as wholly unreal (*anirvacanīya-khyāti*). The Nyāya and Bhāṭṭa realists hold that an illusion occurs by the dislocated appearance of a real object (perceived in the past) in another place and time (*anyathā-khyāti*). Rāmānuja (Vedāntin) holds that the so-called illusory object is really not unreal; it is the appearance of the real element (*sat-khyāti*) which is common to the present reality and what it is apprehended as. The Prabhākara school of the Mīmāṁsā, like Rāmānuja, holds that all knowledge is valid (*akhyāti*), and that what is called an illusion is really a mixture of two valid mental states, the perception of the presented reality and the vividly revived memory of a similar thing perceived in the past.

We see here again the wide variety of standpoints and theories ranging from extreme nihilism to extreme realism.

The Methods of Philosophy

We shall now try to give a very brief idea of the different methods adopted by Indian thinkers for reaching philosophical truths.

The earliest philosophical treatises of India are the Upaniṣads, which are many in number. The earliest of them go back to about two thousand years before Christ. Some of these are written in verse and contain inspired utterances of truths which come with the force of direct realization and, therefore, are not supported by any reasoning. But some are written in prose and in the form of dialogues between the student and the teacher. We find in them the beginnings of attempts at removing doubts by examples and arguments. But still the art of reasoning with mere words (called in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad vākovākya*), without the backing of spiritual insight and experience, was not at all encouraged. But later on in the *Mahābhārata*, in Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra* (*Treatise on Political Economy*), and in the *Manu-saṁhitā* we find much appreciation of the science of reasoning (variously referred to as *ānvīkṣikī*, *hetu-vidyā*, etc.).

In Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra* we find an elaborate treatment of the methods which should be adopted for carrying on arguments and establishing philosophical theories. There is also an elaborate account of the many defects and errors which should be avoided. Vātsyāyana, the commentator on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, gives a hint that Gautama is not the first propounder of this branch of knowledge, and the detailed nature of the treatise also strongly suggests that the work must have been preceded by long discussion, analysis, and practice of the art of debate, the results of which were available to Gautama. The followers of Gautama develop this branch, particularly the theory of inference, in the course of about two thousand years. The Nyāya method and the technical language for carrying on arguments came to be adopted to a large extent by all the other schools, with occasional addition and alteration. So,

we should briefly discuss this method in the light of Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra.*

Doubt (*saṁśaya*) is regarded by Gautama as the chief incentive to philosophical inquiry. For the removal of doubt one must consider carefully the pros and cons (*pakṣa-pratipakṣa*) and ascertain the true nature of things. For this purpose one is advised to take the help of all valid sources of knowledge, use (and avoid conflict with) previously established theories (*siddhānta*), use examples (*dṛṣṭānta*) which are acceptable to all, employ the five-step method of discovery and proof (*pañcāvayava-nyāya*), use the indirect hypothetical or postulational method of strengthening the conclusion (*tarka*), and also take care to avoid five kinds of material fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*), three kinds of quibbles (*chala*), twenty-four kinds of false analogies (*jāti*), and twenty-two kinds of self-stultifying steps which would cause defeat in debates. This elaborate method of critical inquiry was regarded as the light for all branches of knowledge, as the means of all (*rational*) activity, and as the basis of all virtues (*dharmas*).

It is only when such a rigorous method is employed that the solution of any problem can claim to be a *vāda,* that is, a full-fledged theory.

In further clarification of this standard method, let us observe a few important points from Gautama, Vātsyāyana, and other general writers. Every philosophical discussion starts with an explicit statement of its utility (*prayojana*) for human good (*puruṣārtha*).

The ultimate purpose of philosophical knowledge is the avoidance of evil, pursuit of desirable ends, and remaining indifferent to other things. Philosophical discussion arises from the desire to know (*jijñāsā*) and from doubt (*saṁśaya*). It aims at the elimination of doubt. It is based on the assumption that argument and the arguer have the capacity of attaining truth.[12] Though doubt is necessary for philosophy, it must be given up when it leads to contradiction.[13]

The material basis of philosophical discussion is the individual's own direct experience (*pratīti* or *anubhava*), including introspection and knowledge obtained from other valid sources. Not only normal waking experience, but also sleep, dream, and other kinds of experience should be explained and utilized. Current linguistic usage (*vyavahāra*), implying socially accepted experience, is often taken as the material basis of philosophical theories (cf. Socrates). Knowledge of previously established theories (*siddhānta*) is a source of new theories and helps one also to avoid errors. Distinction must be made, however, among (1) universally accepted theories, (2) sectarian theories, (3) implied theories, and (4) theories admitted for argument's sake.[14]

Philosophical discussion should proceed by accurate definition of terms (*lakṣaṇa*) and indication of their denotation (*uddeśa*).

One should not believe that what cannot be perceived does not exist. For, failure to perceive may be due to the object's being too distant, too near, too subtle, too much mixed up with other things, to the senses' being damaged, or to lack of concentration.[15] Knowledge of the unperceived may be obtained from inference based on analogy and general observation or from postulation (i.e., necessary supposition), or, in some cases, from reliable authority possessed of superior knowledge of the unperceived.

One of the important criteria of a good supposition adopted by all is its lightness (*lāghava*), that is, simplicity, as opposed to its undue heaviness (*gaurava*), i.e., redundance (cf. Occam's razor). Again, so long as the perceived is sufficient, nothing unperceived should be supposed.[16] The supposition of an unperceived cause is justified only if it can explain the perceived effect. When many alternative suppositions are possible, either (1) the acceptable alterative is retained by the method of residues (*pāriśeṣya*) by eliminating the defective ones, or (2) all the alternatives may be examined and found defective, and nothing can be ascertained. In the latter case the very basic presupposition underlying the many alternatives is shown to be wrong.

The validity of a theory is also indirectly established by *tarka,* which consists in showing that the supposition of its contradictory leads to undesirable consequences. These latter are enumerated by Gautama as the defects of (1) self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*), (2) mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*), (3) circular reasoning (*cakraka*), and (4) infinite regress (*anavasthā*)—all these errors may be either in respect of origination or existence or knowledge of the thing or things about which discussion is held. In addition to these four, there is a residual class of general defects, the chief of which is contradiction (*virodha*), i.e., conflict with either itself (*svavirodha*) or with other established facts, ideas, and theories. Non-contradiction (*a-bādhitatva*), coherence (*saṁvāda*), agreement with facts (*yāthārthya*), practical utility (*arthakriyā-kāritva*), self-evidence (*sva-prakāśatva*), etc., are recognized by different thinkers as the criteria of truth. The laws of contradiction and excluded

middle are explicitly formulated by Udayana in the following way: If two terms are contradictory, they cannot be identical, nor can there be any other alternative besides these.[17]

Conclusion

It is hoped that even this very meager account of Indian epistemology will not fail to point out the following important facts. In epistemology, as elsewhere, the Indian mind has regarded philosophical discussion as a means to a better life, and consequently great emphasis is laid on living and realizing in life the truths obtained in philosophy. Not in spite of this, but because of this, there is a rigorous and sincere attempt to ascertain all possible avenues to knowledge and to evolve the different rational methods of checking and correcting knowledge and ascertaining truth in such a way that unsound philosophy may not ruin life. Reason and argument, therefore, find their full place here as in Western philosophy. If there are differences between certain Indian and Western ideas and beliefs, we have only to bear in mind that there have been greater differences between Indians and Indians, as well as Westerners and Westerners. So, these differences may not be all racial but mostly individual. On the other hand, there is ample similarity and identity of thought as well between the Indian and the Westerner. This is no wonder, but is what it should be if man is human and reason is his chief instrument for understanding things and convincing his fellow creatures.

Notes

1. See Vātsyāyana, Commentary on Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra.* See S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, ed. and trans., Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. VIII (Allahabad: The Panini Office, 1913), I.i.1.
2. For an elaborate discussion, see D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing* (2nd ed.; Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1960).
3. See Dharmakīrti, *Nyāya-bindu,* with Commentary of Dharmottarācharya, P. Peterson, ed. (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1929), chap. I.
4. For a detailed discussion, see D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing,* chap. VI.
5. See S. C. Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1939), chaps. IX–X.
6. Patañjali, *Yoga-sūtra,* Ram Prasad, ed. and trans., Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. IV (Allahabad: The Panini Office, 1912), III.19.25 ff., *et passim.*

7. See *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1930), and D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing,* on perception.
8. For an excellent account of scientific methods, see B. N. Seal, *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915).
9. *Nyāya-sūtra,* I.i.6.
10. Jaimini, *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra,* M. L. Sandal, ed. and trans., Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. XXVIII (Allahabad: The Panini Office, 1923), I.i.5.
11. The word "knowledge" seems peculiar in this and the following paragraphs, but Mr. Datta has requested that no change be made. His explanation is as follows: "I understand it [the word 'knowledge'] is not usually used in this sense, but that is because European philosophy does not recognize more than two kinds of knowledge (perception and inference). Indian philosophy makes a strong case for the extension of this limited view and hence the strain put on 'knowledge.' I would, therefore, keep it, for want of a better substitute. Moreover, a change here would require many other changes in other parts of the paper." [Editor's note.]
12. See Vātsyāyana, Commentary on *Nyāya-sūtra,* I.i.32.
13. Udayana, *Kusumāñjali,* E. B. Cowell, ed. and trans. (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1864), III.7. See also Ravi Tirtha, trans. (Madras: Adyar Library, 1946), Vol. I, Bks. I, II.
14. *Nyāya-sūtra,* I.i.26–31.
15. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, *Sāṁkhya-kārikā,* Suryanarayana Sastri, ed. and trans. (Madras: Madras University, 1935), pp. 7–8.
16. *"Dṛṣṭe tu na adṛṣṭam,"* Puruṣārthānuśāsanam.
17. *Kusumāñjali,* III.8: *"Paraspara-virodhe hi na prakārāntara-sthitiḥ/ Naikatāpi viruddhānām ukti-mātra-virodhataḥ."*

P. T. RAJU *Extracted from "Indian Epistemology and the World and the Individual"*

AS SAID EARLIER, not all of the conference papers presented by Indians are included in this volume. "Indian Epistemology and the World and the Individual," by P. T. Raju is one of these. This is an important aspect of Indian philosophy, little known and almost completely ignored by non-Indians.

The reason for including this extract is to indicate to Westerners the *genuine importance* in Indian philosophy of epistemology, semantics, logic, and grammar.

Indian epistemology is generally divided into three topics: (1) The distinct means (*pramāṇas*) of obtaining valid knowledge; (2) the nature of validity (*prāmāṇya*); and (3) the nature and status of the object of illusion (*khyāti*).

Semantics was from the beginning of the systems a part of epistemology, for the word was recognized as a distinct means of valid knowledge by almost all the schools and classified under the means of knowledge . . . . verbal knowledge is a distinct kind of knowledge. . . . In addition, the Veda was orally transmitted and was considered to be sacrosanct. How can the words of the Veda contain the mystery of the universe? Hence, also, the philosophical interest in the word. In the third place, grammar was prescribed as an indispensable subsidiary study to the Veda; it must therefore lead to what the Veda teaches, namely, knowledge of the most important reality. Then, the philosophy of grammar must be almost as important as the philosophy of the Veda and has to support it. Hence the importance of the philosophy of grammar. But, as the philosophy

of the Veda is differently understood by the different schools, they developed different philosophies of grammar also. Thus the interest in the nature of language, grammar, and semantics was very intense from the very beginning.

Right from the time of Gautama (*ca.* 400 B.C.), the founder of the Nyāya [the logical system of the famous Six Systems of Hindu Philosophy], or perhaps even from an earlier time, it has been recognized that the knowable (*prameya*) is dependent upon the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), i.e., metaphysics is dependent on epistemology. But, *first,* as is often done in the West, we can so interpret the same epistemological processes and criteria as to fit a particular metaphysics. The schools need not accept the same metaphysics even when they accept the same sources of knowledge. *Second,* Indian thought did not start in the Upaniṣads with epistemology, but with a kind of ontology, to which at least nominally all the orthodox schools owe allegiance. *Third,* even if a school accepts a number of ways of knowing, that does not mean that whatever is known through those ways is also accepted as unmistakably true. This distinction is often overlooked, but it is important. The question is about the ways by which our consciousness can reveal Being or beings . . . . if every one of them is a means of valid knowledge, how can invalidity come in? And what is, then, the nature of invalid knowledge? *Fourth,* if we have several sources of valid knowledge, what are we to do when there is conflict between any two or three? Śaṁkara says that in such cases perception has to be ignored and inference is to be accepted. Rāmānuja says that both have to be accepted and somehow reconciled. In any case, Indian philosophers maintain that with the help of the different sources of knowledge we have to build up our knowledge.

The question of the validity of knowledge occurred to the Indian thinkers in a peculiar way. They knew that every one of the ways of knowing may misfire: illusions and hallucinations of perception are false; fallacious inference cannot give truth; postulation has to stand the test of modal negation (*tarka*); and so on. They knew also that whatever is contradicted cannot be valid. . . .

The Nairukta philosophy of language: Yāska, the author of *Nirukta,* the earliest lexicon in the world, refers to the view of Śākaṭāyana, who maintained that all nouns are derived from verbal roots. Yāska accepts this view because it agrees with his philosophy that the *Ātman* is the ultimate reality and that it is activity itself. This

understanding of the *Ātman* is in accord with the etymological meaning of the word *"Brahman,"* which is derived from the verbal root *"bṛh,"* meaning "to grow," "to expand. . . ." The *Brahman* is the ever-growing, the ever-expanding. . . . Being is activity itself. "To be" is a verb and represents an act. Then the primary part of the sentence is the verb. . . . The most basic of all verbs is the root *"as"* (to be). What we have to note is that "to be" is an act, and the "is" is not a mere copula. In the Nairukta philosophy, Being is the same as becoming. . . .

The first peculiarity of Bhartṛhari's [the greatest of the Grammarians] semantic theory is that there is no cognition without a corresponding verbal sentence. . . .

Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language is based, of course, upon the grammatical structure of Sanskrit. . . . Furthermore, Sanskrit has its own peculiarities, particularly the compounds. The schools differed from one another in interpreting them. Not even the Grammarians are unanimous. . . .

For the Advaita of Saṁkara, all knowledge is meant ultimately to reveal the primary Being itself, although in the pragmatic world we are interested in secondary beings and ignore Being. For both the Nairuktas and the Grammarian Bhartṛhari, also, the ultimate purpose of knowledge is to reveal primary Being itself, however differently it is understood. Both base their philosophies on language, not merely on logic. Their methodology is etymology and analysis of grammar, respectively. . . .

All the schools, including the Advaita and Mahāyāna Buddhism, affirm that this world satisfies also the pragmatic criterion of truth, although many schools of the Vedānta and of Buddhism say that this world is only that which satisfies the pragmatic criterion. For they say that this world is only a world of action. But the others maintain that this is a world that exists in its own right also. Here we see the interpenetration of epistemology and metaphysics.

Who's Who

SIR C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR.

K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Retired Dewan (Prime Minister) of Travancore State, India. Former member of the Madras and Central Cabinets in India. Former Vice Chancellor, Travancore University. Indian representative to the League of Nations, 1926–1927. Law and Commerce Member, Government of India, 1931, 1932, 1942.

B.A., Madras University; LL.B., Law College, Madras; LL.D. (Honorary), Travancore University.

Member, Second East-West Philosophers' Conference, 1949.

President Indian Philosophical Congress, 1946.

Major publications: *Pen-Portraits, Essays and Addresses;* and *Phases of Religion and Culture.*

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B.A., 1932, M.A., 1934, Ph.D., 1945, Calcutta University.

Prefessor of Indian Philosophy, Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1954–1956; Principal, Vidya-Bhavana (College of Post-Graduate Teaching and Research); Viśva-Bharati, 1961–1964. (Now, 1967, Vice Chancellor, Viśva-Bharati.)

Honorary Professor, World Academy of Sanskrit, Bharatiya Vidya-Bhavan, Bombay, 1954–1956; Khudiram Basu Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Calcutta, 1962; Buddha Jayanti Lecturer, Indian Philosophical Congress, Waltair, 1960.

President, Section of Logic and Metaphysics, Poona Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1951; Delegate, Entriens, International Institute of Philosophy, Paris; Member, Board of Studies in Philosophy in the Universities of Calcutta, Gorakhpur, Mysore, Banaras, Saugar, Andhra; Member, Council of Cultural Relations, New Delhi, 1961; Member, Philosophy Review Committee, University Grants Commission, India, 1961; General Secretary, Indian Philosophical Congress, 1961–1964; Honorary Fellow, Indian Academy of Philosophy, Calcutta; Member, American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division; Member, Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta.

Member, Fourth East-West Philosophers' Conference, 1964.

Author of *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy; Object, Content and Relation; The Concept of Cause in India and the West; The Indian Concepts of Knowledge and Self; Language, Logic and Philosophy;* and many articles in professional journals. Editor of *Recent Indian Philosophy* (Selected Papers from the Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1925–1934) and *Rabindranath Tagore Birth Centenary Celebrations,* Vol. III (Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 36th Session). Editor or member of the editorial boards of *Indian Philosophical Quarterly; Journal of the Academy of Philosophy; Bharat Kosa; Rabindra Centenary Publication,* Vol. III; *K. C. Bhattacharrya Memorial Volume; Visva-Bharati Quarterly; Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy.*

TARA CHAND

Honorary Professor, Indian School of International Studies.

Educated at Meerut College, Meerut; Muir Central College, Allahabad; and Queen's College, Oxford.

Member, Indian Parliament; Chairman, History of the Freedom Movement in India, New Delhi.

Kayastha Pathshala College: Professor of History, 1913–1918; Principal, 1925–1945. Allahabad University: Professor of Politics, 1945–1947; Vice Chancellor, 1947–1948. Secretary, Hindustani Academy.

Secretary and Educational Advisor to the Government of India, 1948–1951; President, Indian History Congress; Indian Ambassador to Iran, 1951–1956.

Member, Fourth East-West Philosophers' Conference, 1964.

Publications: *A Short History of the Indian People from the Earliest Times to the Present Day; History of the Freedom Movement in India; Influence of Islam on Indian Culture; Growth of Islamic Thought in India; State and Society in the Mughal Age;* Editor, *Sirr-i-Akbar* and *Gulzar-i-Hall.*

MRS. S. DASGUPTA

Reader in the Department of Philosophy, University of Lucknow, 1950.

M.A., 1930, and Ph.D., 1941, Calcutta University; Ph.D., Cambridge University, 1948.

Lecturer in a Degree College of Calcutta University, 1933–1945; Advanced Research Scholar, Research Department, Government Sanskrit College, 1931–1941.

Awarded the Government Shastri title from the Government Sanskrit College, 1939, and a Ghosh Travelling Fellowship, 1945.

Whitney Fulbright Professor to the University of Nebraska and the University of New Mexico, 1957–1958. Taught at Wellesley College, 1961–1962.

Member: American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division; Council for the Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Poona; Sanskrit Literary Association, Lucknow; University Women's Federation, Lucknow Branch.

Member, Fourth East-West Philosophers' Conference, 1964.

Author of *Development of Moral Philosophy in India.* Collaborated with the late Professor S.N. Dasgupta in the writing of the last three volumes of his five-volume *A History of Indian Philosophy* and edited some of his posthumous publications: *Religion and Rational Outlook; Fundamentals of Indian Art; A History of Indian Philosophy,* Vol. 5; *History of the Religions of the World* (in press); (in Hindi) *Aesthetics.*

DHIRENDRA MOHAN DATTA

Retired Professor of Philosophy, Patna University. Now at Santiniketan, since 1953.

Ph.D., Calcutta University.

Received training for social work in Mahatma Gandhi's Ashram at Sabarmati, Bombay, and did social work in Mymensing villages, 1921–1924.

Formerly Basu Mallik Professor of Indian Philosophy at Bengal National Council of Education, Calcutta; Professor of Philosophy, Patna College, Patna University; Visiting Professor at the University of Wisconsin and the University of Minnesota.

General President, Indian Philosophical Congress, 1952.

Member, East-West Philosophers' Conferences, 1949 and 1959.

Publications: *Six Ways of Knowing; Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (with S. C. Chatterjee); *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy;* and *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi.*

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

University Professor of Philosophy, University of Madras.

B.A., Presidency and Pachaiyappa's colleges, Madras, 1933; University research scholar, 1933–1935; Ph.D., University of Madras, 1937.

Professor of Philosophy, Pachaiyappa's College, Madras, 1937–1943; Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Madras, 1943–.

In 1948–1949, lectured on Indian Philosophy at Cornell University and other American universities; gave the Foerster Foundation Lecture at the University of California (Berkeley); participated in the Goethe Bicentennial Convocation at Aspen, Colorado.

General President of the Thirtieth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1955.

Program Member, East-West Philosophers' Conferences, University of Hawaii, 1949 and 1959.

Among his publications are: *The Philosophy of Advaita; Outlines of Hinduism; Guadapāda: A Study in Early Advaita; Time and the Timeless; The Idea of God in Śaiva Siddhānta.*

GUNAPALA PIYASENA MALALASEKERA

High Commissioner for Ceylon in London. Emeritus Professor, University of Ceylon.

College, Panadura, Ceylon, 1918; M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt., University of London. D.Phil., (Honorary) Moscow University.

Vice-Principal, Ananda College, Colombo, 1921–1923; Principal, Nalanda Vidyalaya, Colombo, 1925–1927. Professor of Pali and Buddhist Civilization, University of Ceylon, from its inception to the time of appointment as the Ambassador for Ceylon to the U.S.S.R. in 1957.

Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Ceylon, for nine years.

Formerly Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and Poland, Minister of Ceylon to Romania; High Commissioner for Ceylon in Canada. Permanent Representative of Ceylon to the United Nations; Deputy Chairman, Ceylon Delegation to the United Nations Assembly sessions and to the General Assembly; Leader of the Ceylon Delegation to UNESCO, 1960.

President: All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, 1939–1958; Ceylon Society of Arts, 1955–1959; World Fellowship of Buddhists, 1950–1958; Indian Philosophical Congress, 1957.

Lectured widely in Europe, Asia, and the United States and participated in many East-West Symposia of UNESCO.

Panel Member, East-West Philosophers' Conferences, 1949 and 1964.

Among his publications are: *The Pali Literature of Ceylon; The Buddha and His Teachings; Commentary on the Mahāvamsa; The Extended Mahāvaṁsā;* many articles in scholarly journals. Editor-in-chief, *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism;* Editor of several Sinhalese translations in the field.

SWAMI NIKHILANANDA

Leader, Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, New York.

Spent four years at University of Calcutta. Joined the Ramakrishna Order in 1921. Came to America in 1931. Founded the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center of New York in 1933.

Taught a special course on Indian thought at Columbia University; Member, Seminar on Inter-religious Relations, Columbia University; frequent lecturer at universities, churches, and other cultural organizations.

Delegate to Second and Third East-West Philosophers' Conferences, 1949 and 1959.

Among his works are *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna; The Bhagavad Gītā; The Upanishads* (4 vols.); *Self-Knowledge; Vedāntasāra; Hinduism: Ātma-Vidyā and Its Meaning for the Liberation of the Spirit.*

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Educated at Madras Christian College.

Professor of Philosophy, Presidency College, 1909–1917, and Mysore University, 1918–1921; Professor of Mental and Moral Science, Calcutta University. Vice Chancellor, Andhra University; Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, Oxford University; Vice Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University; President, Indian Philosophical Congress, 1927; Chancellor, Delhi University.

Upton Lecturer, Oxford University; Haskell Lecturer, University of Chicago, 1926; and Hibbert Lecturer, Oxford University, 1929.

Member, League of Nations International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation; Leader of Indian Delegation to UNESCO, 1946–1952; Chairman, UNESCO Executive Board; President of UNESCO, 1948–1949. Ambassador to U.S.S.R., 1949–1952. Vice President of India, 1952–1962. President of India, 1962–.

Panel Member for East-West Philosophers' Conference 1959; Honorary Member, 1964.

Major publications include: *Indian Philosophy* (2 vols.); *Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore; Hindu View of Life; Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy; An Idealist View of Life; East and West in Religion; Kalki or the Future of Civilization; Religion and Society; Eastern Religions and Western Thought; India and China; The Bhagavadgītā; The Dhammapada; The Principal Upanishads; The Brahma Sutra.*

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B.A., Allahabad University, 1928; M.A., 1931, Ph.D., 1935, Calcutta University; Sampūrṇa Madhyama, Śāstri, Banaras Sanskrit College.

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Sir Hari Singh Foundation Lectures, Saugar University, 1956; Woodward Lecture, Yale University, 1950; Century Fund Lecture, Northwestern University, 1953; has also lectured at many European and American universities.

General President, All-India Philosophical Conference, 1958; General President, Indian Philosophical Congress, 1960.

Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Rajasthan, 1950–1953; Member, Committee on Gandhian Life and Philosophy, Ministry of Education, India, until 1962. Participant in several international conferences.

Member: American Philosophical Association (Eastern and Western Divisions), American Oriental Society, Metaphysical Society of America, Association for Asian Studies, American Academy of Political and Social Science.

Awarded the Order of Merit, "Padma Bhūshan," by the President of India, 1958, "for contributions to East-West understanding at the philosophical level."

Panel Member, East-West Philosophers' Conferences, 1949, 1959, 1964.

Author of nearly 150 articles in Indian, European, and American journals and the following books: *Thought and Reality: Hegelianism and Advaita; Idealistic Thought of India; Introduction to Comparative Philosophy; Indian Idealism and Modern Challenges;* Co-editor: *Comparative Studies in Philosophy* and *The Concept of Man: A Study in Comparative Philosophy.*

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Deputy Director (Editorial), Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting of the Government of India, 1947–1954.

Visiting Professor of Indian Philosophy and Culture, University of Hawaii, 1950–1952. Lectured widely in Europe, Japan, and the United States.

Panel Member, East-West Philosophers' Conferences, 1959 and 1964.

Author of *Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy,* articles in learned journals, and chapters in many symposium volumes. Member, Board of Editors, *Philosophy East and West;* formerly co-editor, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly.*

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